As a freshman congressman in the early 1980s, John McCain did not disclose his connections to a controversial group that was implicated in a secretive plot to supply arms to Nicaraguan militia groups during the Iran-Contra affair.

McCain did not list his service on the board of the U.S. Council for World Freedom on mandatory congressional disclosure forms asking about positions he held outside government.
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McCain joined the board of the U.S. Council soon after Singlaub founded it in McCain's adopted hometown of Phoenix in November 1981 as the U.S. branch of the World Anti-Communist League. The league billed itself as a supporter of "pro-Democratic resistance movements fighting communist totalitarianism," but it had also been branded by critics as a haven for extremists, racists and anti-Semites.

But McCain campaign spokesman Brian Rogers told Politico that McCain notified the group of his intent to leave the board in September 1984 because "questions were raised about its activities.

If confirmed by the Senate, Negroponte, 65, will assume a post created by legislation aimed at overhauling the nation's intelligence system. . . . "As DNI [director of national intelligence], John will lead a unified intelligence community and will serve as the principal adviser to the president on intelligence matters," Bush said in making the announcement. He said Negroponte would have authority over budgets and that the CIA director would report to Negroponte. Bush also said that Negroponte would be "my primary briefer" on intelligence on a daily basis and would have regular access to the president, although he would not work in the White House. . . . The new director will oversee agencies with combined budgets of more than $40 billion, and Bush made clear that Negroponte would have considerable authority over setting those budgets and other matters. Negroponte "will have the authority to order the collection of new intelligence, to ensure the sharing of information among agencies, and to establish common standards for the intelligence community's personnel," Bush said. "It will be John's responsibility to determine the annual budgets for all national intelligence agencies and offices and to direct how these funds are spent. Vesting these in a single official who reports directly to me will make our intelligence efforts better coordinated, more efficient and more effective." Bush said that while CIA Director Porter J. Goss would report to Negroponte, the CIA would "retain its core of responsibilities for collecting human intelligence, analyzing intelligence from all sources and supporting American interests abroad at the direction of the president."

Intelligence Battalion 3-16 was also created in the early 1980s with the help of the CIA. Together with the DNI, Battalion 3-16 is blamed for the repression, capture, interrogation and disappearance of about 180 people, generally popular movement leaders.

Barrera . . . recalled how he nearly suffocated people with rubber masks, how he attached wires to their genitals and shocked them with electricity, how he tore off a man's testicles with a rope. "We let them stay in their own excrement," he said, his gold front tooth reflecting the dim lamplight. "When they were very weak, we would take them to disappear."

"I responded to the Economist, I also responded to the committee in 1989, in good faith and to this day, I did not believe that death squads were operating [in Honduras]."

A former commander of Battalion 316, General Luis Alonso Discua Elvir, might have made an informative witness at Negroponte's confirmation hearing, but although he has lived in Florida for several years, he is suddenly unavailable. He left the United States in February after his residence visa was canceled . . . When an American reporter asked about the notorious battalion, he demurred, saying he wanted no more "problems with the United States" because "your country is too powerful."

What to do about the deepening quagmire of Iraq? The Pentagon's latest approach is being called "the Salvador option"-and the fact that it is being discussed at all is a measure of just how worried Donald Rumsfeld really is. "What everyone agrees is that we can't just go on as we are," one senior military officer told NEWSWEEK. "We have to find a way to take the offensive against the insurgents. Right now, we are playing defense. And we are losing." Last November's operation in Fallujah, most analysts agree, succeeded less in breaking "the back" of the insurgency-as Marine Gen. John Sattler optimistically declared at the time-than in spreading it out.

Now, NEWSWEEK has learned, the Pentagon is intensively debating an option that dates back to a still-secret strategy in the Reagan administration's battle against the leftist guerrilla insurgency in El Salvador in the early 1980s. Then, faced with a losing war against Salvadoran rebels, the U.S. government funded or supported "nationalist" forces that allegedly included so-called death squads directed to hunt down and kill rebel leaders and sympathizers. Eventually the insurgency was quelled, and many U.S. conservatives consider the policy to have been a success-despite the deaths of innocent civilians and the subsequent Iran-Contra arms-for-hostages scandal. (Among the current administration officials who dealt with Central America back then is John Negroponte, who is today the U.S. ambassador to Iraq. Under Reagan, he was ambassador to Honduras.)

Pentagon sources emphasize there has been no decision yet to launch the Salvador option. Last week, Rumsfeld decided to send a retired four-star general, Gary Luck, to Iraq on an open-ended mission to review the entire military strategy there. But with the U.S. Army strained to the breaking point, military strategists note that a dramatic new approach might be needed-perhaps one as potentially explosive as the Salvador option.